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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
01 In most respects, but not without exception, the State and its emanations are 
subject to the ‘rule of law’ which, as interpreted by the 19th-century constitutional 
historian AV Dicey, entails their equal subjection – in common with persons 
generally – to the ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts.1 Th e 
principle applies to every public body and every public offi  cial.  Generally 
speaking, public bodies and public offi  cials are therefore subject to the same 
tortious liabilities as private persons. Th ey are not liable without more for causing 
damage in breach of their duties or in wrongful exercise of their powers. Th e 
circumstances must be such as to make out the elements of a recognised ‘tort’2 
or to trigger the obligation to provide just satisfaction for violation of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA).3 As regards liability in tort, the principles applied have 
for the most part been developed through judicial decision, though statute 
has also played a role – for example, in establishing additional liabilities and 
removing certain common law restrictions on liability. Fault is almost always 
required. In terms of practical signifi cance, the three most important bases of 
claim against a public authority in tort are negligence, breach of statutory duty 
and misfeasance in public offi  ce.
02 Dicey’s idea of equality before the law – though it holds good to a 
considerable extent – is subject to a number of exceptions: (a) there is one tort, 
misfeasance in public offi  ce, that applies only to public offi  cials; (b)  particular 
public offi  cials (eg judges) benefi t from a general immunity from tortious 
liability; (c)  various conceptual devices restrict the tortious liability of other 
emanations of the State (justiciability, discretion, the policy sphere); (d) the courts 
tend to be more willing to negate a duty of care for reasons of public policy 
where a public defendant is involved; (e) punitive (or exemplary) damages may 
be awarded for ‘oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants 
of the government’ in circumstances where no such award would be possible 
against a private person; and (f) the liability to compensate under the HRA is 
1 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) Lectures V and 
VI. For nuanced discussion, see P Cane, Damages in Public Law (1999) Otago L Rev 489, 490 
f and 507 f; C Harlow, State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (2004) 6 f and 22 ff ; T Cornford, 
Towards a Public Law of Tort (2008) chs 1 and 2.
2 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 Appeal Cases, Th ird Series (AC) 633, 730 per 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson (‘A claim for damages must be based on a private law cause of action’).
3 It is generally accepted that this liability is not tortious but sui generis: see eg R (Greenfi eld) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 673 at [19] 
per Lord Bingham (‘the 1998 Act is not a tort statute’). As to the distinctive features of HRA 
damages, see nos 7 and 40 below.
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exclusive to public authorities. Th ese points of distinction are elaborated further 
in the analysis below.
B. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION4
03 It was established in 1866 in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees 
v Gibbs5 that public bodies have no blanket immunity from liability in tort, 
opening up the possibility of damages actions being brought against local 
government, the utilities, regulators, and the emergency services. Th e 
immunity of the Crown survived into the 20th century but was largely swept 
away by the Crown Proceedings Act 1947,6 which allowed claims to be brought 
against central government, especially government departments. In the years 
since, litigation against public bodies has increased signifi cantly – no doubt a 
refl ection of the perceived depth of their metaphorical pockets, as well as the 
multifarious ways in which the exercise of their powers and performance of 
their duties can impact upon the lives of ordinary citizens.7 But at the same 
time judicial attitudes towards the expansion of public authority liability have 
altered and a restrictive mindset has come in from the late 1980s onwards, with 
an emphasis upon the need to keep the liability within proper bounds lest it 
unduly depletes public funds, has a detrimental impact upon the performance 
of public functions, or induces judges to interfere inappropriately in matters of 
government.8
04 Th e law’s evolution in this area has not so far been signifi cantly infl uenced 
by EU law, contrary to the past expectations of some commentators.9 Of course, 
the EU law of Member State liability is necessarily part of national law as well, 
but there has been considerable resistance to its full integration within English 
4 See further H Street, Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study (1953) ch 1; C Booth/ 
D Squires, Th e Negligence Liability of Public Authorities (2006) para 1.29 ff ; M Lunney/ 
K Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (5th edn 2013) 491 ff .
5 (1866) Law Reports, 1st series (LR) 1 House of Lords (HL) 93.
6 See generally H Street, Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (1948) 11 Modern Law Review (MLR) 
129. In fact, even before the Act it was the Treasury’s practice to make an ex gratia payment of 
compensation in cases where, but for Crown immunity, the Crown would have been vicariously 
liable for damage caused by a Crown servant: In re M [1994] 2 AC 377, 410 per Lord Woolf.
7 PS Atiyah, Th e Damages Lottery (1997) 78–93 (‘huge growth’); C Harlow, Damages and 
Human Rights [2004] New Zealand Law Review (NZ L Rev) 429, 430 (‘litigation against the 
state has become a growth area’); ead (fn 1) 21 (‘in the modern regulatory state, the state 
intervenes at some point in almost every human activity…, almost every human activity is 
contingently capable of regulation’).
8 See Booth/Squires (fn 4) para 1.33 f and 1.37 ff . As to the policy arguments, see further no 11 ff  
below.
9 See eg PP Craig, Th e Domestic Liability of Public Authorities in Damages: Lessons from the 
EC?, in: J Beatson/T Tridimas (eds), New Directions in European Public Law (1998).
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tort law; the liability is considered distinct and sui generis.10 Further, when 
the Law Commission of England and Wales recommended in 2008 a radical 
structuring of public authority liability on the basis of principles explicitly drawn 
from the CJEU’s jurisprudence on Member State liability,11 this was opposed by 
most commentators and rejected by Government (see further no 53 below). Th e 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has arguably played a bigger 
role in domestic law, especially since the incorporation of specifi ed Convention 
rights into English law through the HRA, though the courts have tended 
to channel claims through the Act’s own remedial mechanism rather than 
developing pre-existing principles of liability law.12
C. DEFINING THE PUBLIC SPHERE
05 Th e distinction between public and private spheres, notwithstanding 
its crucial importance in administrative law, is not of fi rst-rate signifi cance 
in English tort law – precisely because the general principle of equality before 
the law is deemed to entail subjecting public authorities to the same liabilities 
as private persons.13 However, the courts have had to address the meaning of 
‘public offi  ce’14 in determining the scope of the tort of misfeasance in public 
offi  ce, while the HRA defi nes the ‘public authorities’15 who are subject to its 
10 See further KM Stanton, New forms of the tort of breach of statutory duty (2004) 120 Law 
Quarterly Review (LQR) 324; P Giliker, English tort law and the challenge of Francovich 
liability: 20 years on (2012) 128 LQR 541; ead, Th e Europeanisation of English Tort Law (2014) 
ch 4. A further indication that EU law is peripheral in this area is that the leading practitioners’ 
text, Booth/Squires (fn 4), does not discuss it at all, even in its chapter on ‘alternative remedies’ 
(ch 6) – indeed, it includes not a single CJEU decision in its table of cases.
11 Law Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, Consultation Paper 
No  187 (2008), referring in particular to C-6/90, Francovich v Italy [1991] European Court 
Reports (ECR) I-5357.
12 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) ch 7; D Nolan, Negligence and Human Rights Law: Th e 
Case for Separate Development (2013) 76 MLR 286; Giliker, Europeanisation (fn 10) ch 5. See 
further no 40 below. It must be noted that, at the time of writing, it was declared Government 
policy to repeal the HRA, though no concrete proposals had been published.
13 See further C Harlow, ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Law: Defi nition without Distinction (1980) 43 MLR 
241. Cf G Samuel, Public and Private Law: A Private Lawyer’s Response (1983) 46 MLR 558.
14 Any act or omission done or made by a public offi  cial in purported performance of the 
functions of his offi  ce can found an action for misfeasance: Northern Territory of Australia v 
Mengel (1995) 185 Commonwealth Law Reports (CLR) 307, 355 per Brennan J.
15 Th e term includes a court or tribunal, and any person certain of whose functions are 
functions of a public nature: sec  6(3) HRA. In relation to a particular act, a person is not 
a public authority on grounds of its functions of a public nature if the nature of the act is 
private: sec 6(5) HRA. It is therefore clear that a person (a ‘hybrid’ rather than ‘core’ public 
authority) may act as a public authority while exercising public functions and as a private 
person while engaging in acts of a private nature. In this context, ‘public’ has been interpreted 
to mean ‘governmental’, and held not to extend to the operation of care homes by a private 
company to which a local council has delegated its statutory responsibilities as regards the 
provision of care and accommodation: L v Birmingham City Council [2007] United Kingdom 
England and Wales
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duties. Additionally, even in claims in negligence, the concepts of justiciability, 
discretion and the policy sphere are typically applied only to public authorities (or, 
conceivably, private persons) when they exercise specifi cally public functions, 
and not in performing acts of a private nature such as driving or maintaining 
motor vehicles, and providing medical care. Th ere is thus some underlying, 
implied conception of where the line between public and private should be 
drawn, but it is not very precise and to a large extent consists in a sliding scale 
rather than an unwavering boundary.16
D. COURTS AND PROCEDURES
06 Damages claims against public authorities are brought in the ordinary 
courts under the ordinary rules of civil procedure. Th ere is a limited and rarely 
used17 power to order the payment of compensation under administrative law 
proceedings for judicial review,18 which are subject to diff erent procedural 
rules (Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Part 54) and heard by specialised judges 
(though still within the ordinary civil courts). Although CPR Part 54, in the 
interests of effi  cient government, imposes a number of procedural restrictions 
on applications for judicial review (eg a very short limitation period of three 
months19), the courts have allowed litigants to side-step these restrictions by 
bringing ordinary civil claims against a public body in cases where they seek to 
vindicate private rights, amongst which is included the right to recover damages 
for harm caused in breach of a duty of care.20 In such a claim, the ordinary rules 
of evidence (including proof on the balance of probabilities), time limits21 and 
procedures apply.
House of Lords (UKHL) 27, [2008] 1 AC 95 (where the House of Lords accepted that the 
defi nition should refl ect the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
to the identifi cation of those bodies which engage the responsibility of the State under the 
Convention). See further A Williams, Public Authorities, in: D Hoff man (ed), Th e Impact of 
the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (2011).
16 See further Law Commission, Remedies against Public Bodies: A Scoping Report (2006) 
paras 5.9–5.15 (‘What is distinctive about the state as a party’).
17 See no 8 below.
18 Senior Courts Act 1981, sec  31(4). Th e Law Commission proposed that damages should be 
available generally in judicial review, subject to the same (proposed) restrictions as in tort 
(Law Commission, fn 11, para  2.10), but it later retracted its package of proposals in Law 
Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen, Law Com No 322 (2010): 
see no 50 ff  below.
19 Rule 54.5 CPR.
20 See Davy v Spelthorne Borough Council [1984] AC 262.
21 Diff erent time limits previously applied to actions against public authorities but these were 
repealed by the (now also repealed) Law Reform (Limitation of Actions etc) Act 1954. It may 
be noted that the statutes of limitation only have the eff ect of extinguishing the claimant’s 
remedy, not the underlying right of action.
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E. REMEDIES
07 Th e full range of remedies available against private persons is also 
applicable in actions against public authorities. By way of exception, injunctions 
are not available against the Crown22 except insofar as Member State liability 
under EU law is concerned.23 Furthermore, where the claim is founded on 
the HRA, the award of damages is discretionary and governed by principles 
distinct from those applying to ordinary tort claims.24 Otherwise, however, 
entitlement to damages and entitlement to an injunction are assessed according 
to ordinary general principles. Broadly the same requirements apply to both 
remedies, except that injunctions are discretionary remedies and (for example) 
are not available where damages alone would be suffi  cient.25 Damages are 
usually compensatory, but exemplary (or ‘punitive’) damages may sometimes 
be awarded. In fact, one of the two bases on which such awards can be made 
at common law applies exclusively to public authorities: ‘oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional action by the servants of the government’.26 In principle, the 
other common law basis for such awards – where the defendant’s conduct was 
calculated to make a profi t exceeding the compensation payable – also applies 
to the liability of public authorities, but claims of this nature seem unlikely to 
arise in practice. Where one or other of the tests is satisfi ed, exemplary damages 
may be awarded even though the defendant’s liability is vicarious.27 Aggravated, 
nominal and contemptuous damages are available against public authorities as 
they are against private persons.
08 In an application for judicial review, the following remedies may be 
awarded at the court’s discretion: a mandatory, prohibiting or quashing order; 
a declaration or injunction (including an injunction restraining a person from 
acting in an offi  ce in which he or she is not entitled to act); and damages, 
22 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, sec  21. Th e immunity does not apply to ministers and other 
offi  cers of the Crown unless the eff ect of the injunction would be to give relief which could 
not have been obtained in proceedings against the Crown directly: sec 21(2). Th e Act does not 
apply to applications for judicial review: see M v Home Offi  ce [1994] 1 AC 377.
23 See R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd [1991] 1 AC 603.
24 Sec 8 HRA; R (Greenfi eld) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 673 at 
[19] per Lord Bingham. See further no 40 below.
25 See further K Oliphant, Injunctions, in: id (ed), Th e Law of Tort (3rd edn 2015).
26 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1226 per Lord Devlin. In practice, such awards are made 
most frequently against the police: see generally Th ompson v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis [1998] Queen’s Bench (QB) 498. Lord Devlin’s category does not extend to the 
commercial activities of nationalised enterprises (AB v South West Services Ltd [1993] QB 
507) or to the oppressive and arbitrary acts of private corporations or individuals, no matter 
how powerful (Rookes, 1226 per Lord Devlin). For further discussion, see V Wilcox, Punitive 
Damages in England, in: H Koziol/V Wilcox (eds), Punitive Damages: Common Law and 
Civil Law Perspectives (2009).
27 Rowlands v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2007] 1 WLR 1065.
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restitution or the recovery of a sum due.28 A claim that is only for damages, 
restitution or the recovery of a sum due may not be brought as an application 
for judicial review, however.29 If the court quashes the decision to which the 
application relates, it may in addition remit the matter to the court, tribunal 
or authority that made it, with a direction to reconsider the matter and reach 
a decision in accordance with the fi ndings of the court, or substitute its own 
decision.30 Damages are available in judicial review proceedings only where they 
would be recoverable in an ordinary civil claim31 and in practice are awarded 
only ‘in exceptional circumstances’.32
09 A fi nding of public law unlawfulness does not establish the breach of duty 
necessary to bring a civil action for damages. However, the quashing of a decision 
in an application for judicial review may ‘facilitate’ the damages claim,33 and a 
fi nding of ‘irrationality’ may be regarded as conclusive of the public authority’s 
negligence (see no 15 below). Conversely, rejection of the application for judicial 
review may prevent a civil claim for damages in accordance with the normal 
rules on res judicata.
F. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS34
10 Policy considerations either for or (more usually) against liability are 
expressly considered in the tort of negligence in deciding whether or not there 
is a duty of care, and they may well exert a covert infl uence in claims brought 
on other bases. A variety of public policy considerations have, in one case or 
another, been held to negate the duty of care that a public body or public offi  cial 
would otherwise owe. Amongst the most signifi cant are the following: the need 
to preserve public funds;35 the risk of detrimentally defensive action by public 
offi  cials (‘overkill’);36 and the confl ict between the authority’s duty to the public 
and the (proposed) private duty (eg health and social care professionals owe no 
duty of care to the parents of a child they take into protective care on suspicion 
28 Senior Courts Act 1981, sec 31.
29 CPR rule 54.3(2).
30 Senior Courts Act 1981, sec 31(5). Th e Court can substitute its own decision only where there 
was an error of law by a court or tribunal: sec 31(5A).
31 In re M [1994] 2 AC 377, 418 per Lord Woolf.
32 Law Commission (fn 11) para 4.14.
33 Law Commission (fn 11) para 4.17, citing Re McC (A Minor) [1985] AC 528 and R v Governor of 
Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19.
34 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) ch 4.
35 See eg Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 952 per Lord Hoff mann; Booth/Squires (fn 4) para 4.17 ff .
36 See eg Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1988] AC 473, 502 per Lord Keith (Privy Council); 
Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53, 63 per Lord Keith; Booth/Squires (fn 4) 
para 4.26 ff .
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of having been abused: a duty to the parents might confl ict with the overriding 
duty owed to the child37). Th e concern to respect the constitutional separation 
of powers is evident in various concepts employed to limit the scope for judicial 
consideration of the reasonableness of administrative decisions, most notably 
justiciability, discretion and the policy/operations dichotomy (see further 
no 21 ff  below).
II. LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT OR 
FAULT
A. BASIC PRINCIPLES
11 As previously mentioned, public authorities are subject to broadly the same 
tortious liabilities as private persons. Th e principal torts that may be committed 
by public bodies are negligence, breach of statutory duty and misfeasance in public 
offi  ce.38 Th e latter is exceptional in being a liability that may only be incurred by 
a public authority, and not by a private person.
12 Liability normally depends on fault (negligence or intentional wrongdoing) 
rather than the unlawfulness in a public law sense of what was done. Even 
liability for breach of statutory duty can be conceived as fault-based, though 
that depends on the standard laid down by the statute. Generally, no distinction 
is drawn between legal and natural persons, with the consequence that (for 
example) public offi  cers, agents and employees are subject to liability on the same 
conditions as the bodies for which they work, while the latter may incur a ‘direct’ 
liability for their own conduct that is distinct from their vicarious liability for 
others.39
13 Th ere is no general principle by which the State as such (ie the Crown) 
assumes liability for torts committed by public bodies or the latter’s offi  cers, 
agents or employees. But by statute the Crown is subject to certain liabilities 
in tort to which it would be subject if it were a private person of full age and 
capacity, including liability in respect of torts committed by its servants or 
agents.40
37 D v East Berkshire NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373.
38 Th ese are the three torts highlighted as particularly relevant in this context in Law 
Commission (fn 11) para 3.106 ff .
39 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) para 5.56 ff .
40 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, sec 2.
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B. DEFINITIONS
1) General
14 In English law, it is the generally the negligence of the public authority that 
is crucial, not the simple unlawfulness of its action. According to a frequently 
cited dictum, ‘[n]egligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct 
of human aff airs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable 
man would not do.’41 No distinction is made between diff erent grades of 
negligence – in conformity with general tort law.
15 Although the English law of public authority liability focuses on the 
authority’s fault, rather than the unlawfulness of its actions, the relationship of 
the public law conception of unlawfulness and private law fault still warrants 
consideration. In public law, a public authority’s conduct is unlawful if it is 
illegal, irrational or procedurally improper.42 It must be immediately noted 
that neither illegality nor procedural impropriety entails negligence – because 
(for example) the authority may have reasonably misconstrued its powers or 
the procedure to be followed.43 However, the same does not seem to be true 
as regards the other form of public law unlawfulness, namely, irrationality. 
A public authority acts irrationally in the necessary sense if its conduct is so 
unreasonable that no reasonable public authority could have acted in the same 
way. Th is test is sometimes known as the test of ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ 
aft er the leading case.44 It seems to be a necessary inference that conduct that 
is Wednesbury unreasonable must also be negligent; however, such conduct 
will not necessarily give rise to liability in the tort of negligence, because that 
requires that the defendant owe the claimant a duty of care in respect of the type 
of harm suff ered, and no duty will be owed unless such harm was reasonably 
foreseeable, a proximate relationship existed between the parties, and it would be 
fair, just and reasonable to recognise a duty of care.45
41 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) 11 Exchequer Reports (Ex) 781, 784 per Baron 
Alderson.
42 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
43 See especially Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1988] AC 473.
44 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 King’s Bench (KB) 223.
45 Caparo v Dickman plc [1990] 2 AC 605.
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2) Specifi c Torts
a) Negligence46
16 For most practical purposes, public authority liability in English law refers 
to liability in the tort of negligence. A number of specifi c points must be noted: 
(a)  Th e ordinary requirements of a duty of care, breach of duty, and resulting 
harm all apply. (b) A duty of care will not be found to exist simply because the 
defendant has been entrusted with a public function and public funds with the 
intention of benefi ting a class of which the claimant is a member. Th e bases on 
which a duty of care can be imposed on a public body or public offi  cial are the 
same as those applicable to private persons. (c)  Conversely, a variety of public 
policy considerations may negate the duty of care that a public body or public 
offi  cial would otherwise owe (see no 10 above). Such policy considerations may 
also negate any duty of care where the defendant is a private person, but they 
seem to be given greater weight in claims against the State. (d) Over time, the 
courts have also invoked various other concepts (eg the non-justiciability of 
certain decisions, including policy decisions and those involving the exercise 
of discretion) to preclude liability for negligence in the performance of public 
functions. How these concepts fi t with the ordinary requirements of the tort is 
not entirely clear and has been much debated.47 (e) For the above reasons, and 
others that cannot be addressed here, public authority (negligence) liability in 
English law is very limited in scope compared with other European systems, 
and several liabilities the latter would consider typical cannot arise (eg negligent 
refusal of a licence or permit48).
b) Breach of Statutory Duty49
17 Perhaps the next most important head of liability that a public authority 
may incur is for breach of statutory duty. In English law, this is considered to 
be a distinct tort in its own right, independent of liability in negligence.50 
English law does not therefore accept the ‘statutory negligence’ approach – under 
which breach of the statute itself automatically constitutes negligence – that has 
prevailed in some other common law jurisdictions51 and indeed in parts of the 
civil law world.
46 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) passim.
47 See especially SH Bailey/MJ Bowman, Th e Policy/Operational Dichotomy – A Cuckoo in 
the Nest [1986] Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 430; SH Bailey/MJ Bowman, Public Authority 
Negligence Revisited [2000] CLJ 85. See further no 21 ff  below.
48 See Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853.
49 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) para 6.31 ff .
50 London Passenger Transport Board v Upson [1949] AC 155.
51 Cf Th e Queen in the Right of Canada v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool [1983] 1 Supreme Court 
Reports (SCR) 205 (Canada).
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18 It is not every breach of statutory duty causing damage that attracts tortious 
liability. One has to refer to the purpose of the rule in question. It must be shown 
that Parliament intended not only (a) to protect the class of which the claimant 
is a member from the misfortune in question, but also (b) to provide a remedy 
in damages if damage should result from the breach.52 In fact, Parliament 
rarely gives consideration to the question of private law remedies for the breach 
of statutory duties, and this requirement provides fertile ground for dispute. 
It would be fair to say that the courts have been reluctant to fi nd any intent to 
impose liability in damages where the defendant is a public authority and that 
the tort consequently plays a limited role here in practice.53
c) Misfeasance in Public Offi  ce54
19 Misfeasance in public offi  ce, the only tort directed exclusively at public 
authorities, is committed where a public offi  cial deliberately injures the claimant 
or deliberately acts in excess of authority.55 In principle, the liability applies to any 
such act or omission done or made by a public offi  cial in purported performance 
of the functions of the offi  ce.56 In practice, the signifi cance of this liability too has 
been limited, largely because of the diffi  culty of proving intentional wrongdoing.
20 Misfeasance in public offi  ce is a direct liability of the offi  cer alone, not of 
the public body for which the offi  cer works or the State. Although conscious 
misfeasance is the basis of the tort, vicarious liability can nevertheless arise in 
this context in an appropriate case.57
C. DISCRETION AND JUSTICIABILITY58
21 Over time English law has developed a number of mechanisms to make 
allowance for the element of discretion inherent in many decisions taken by or 
on behalf of the State, and the inherent unsuitability (or limited suitability) of 
many such decisions for judicial determination. Th e most important concepts 
employed in the case law are:  (1) vires; (2) discretion; (3) a distinction between 
‘policy’ and ‘operational’ spheres; (4) justiciability; and (5) irrationality.
52 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 731 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
53 Law Commission (fn 11) para 4.75 ff .
54 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) para 6.02 ff ; M Aronson, Misfeasance in Public Offi  ce: A 
Very Peculiar Tort (2011) 35 Melbourne University L Rev 1; J Murphy, Misfeasance in a Public 
Offi  ce: A Tort Law Misfi t? (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (OJLS) 51.
55 Th ree Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] AC 1.
56 Northern Territory of Australia v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, 355 per Brennan J.
57 Racz v Home Offi  ce [1994] 2 AC 45. Cf the approach to vicarious liability and exemplary 
damages: see no 7 ff  above.
58 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) ch 2; Lunney/Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (fn 4).
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1) Vires
22 In Home Offi  ce v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd,59 perhaps the fi rst modern attempt to 
grapple with the negligence liability of public authorities,60 it was suggested that 
liability should turn on an application of the public law test of whether or not the 
defendant’s conduct was ultra vires. Lord Diplock stated:61
‘Th e public law concept of ultra vires has replaced the civil law concept of negligence 
as the test of the legality, and consequently of the actionability, of acts or omissions 
of government departments or public authorities done in the exercise of a discretion 
conferred on them by Parliament…’
23 Th ough later cases adopted the language of vires, the diffi  culties inherent in 
this approach soon came to be recognised.62 Th e mere fact that a public authority 
has been found to have acted ultra vires does not mean that consequential injury 
should be actionable. Ultra vires conduct is not necessarily negligent conduct (eg 
in the case of a non-culpable misconstruction of a statute); nor does it establish 
the elements of foreseeability, proximity and fairness, justice and reasonableness 
which are necessary to give rise to a duty of care. Indeed, where ultra vires 
merely denotes a procedural error or the misconstruction of a power, the subject-
matter of the case before the court may remain entirely unsuitable for judicial 
resolution.
2) Discretion
24 Another approach has been to ask whether the conduct in question fell 
within the ambit of a discretion that the defendant was exercising. In the Dorset 
Yacht case, Lord Reid elaborated:63
‘Where Parliament confers a discretion … there may, and almost certainly will, 
be errors of judgment in exercising such a discretion and Parliament cannot have 
intended that members of the public should be entitled to sue in respect of such 
errors. But there must come a stage when the discretion is exercised so carelessly or 
unreasonably that there has been no real exercise of the discretion which Parliament 
59 [1970] AC 1004.
60 As suggested by Booth/Squires (fn 4) para 1.02.
61 [1970] AC 1004, 1067.
62 See eg X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 736 per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson (‘I do not believe that it is either helpful or necessary to introduce public law 
concepts as to the validity of a decision into the question of liability at common law for 
negligence’). In fact, doubts have even been expressed about the utility of the concept of ultra 
vires in public law: see eg P Craig, Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review [1998] 
CLJ 63.
63 [1970] AC 1004, 1031.
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has conferred. Th e person purporting to exercise his discretion has acted in abuse or 
excess of his power.’
25 On the facts of the case, the Law Lords held that the carelessness of offi  cers 
at a young off ender institution in leaving a group of boys unsupervised while 
engaged in extramural activities was indeed in excess of any discretion that 
had been conferred upon them. Lord Pearson distinguished a situation where 
‘the defendants had, in the exercise of their discretion, released some of these 
boys, taking them on shore and putting them on trains or buses with tickets to 
their homes’.64 Th is would have been a valid exercise of discretion for which no 
liability could arise.
26 Th ough not all are convinced by the utility or aptness of the concept,65 
later cases have accepted no liability can arise for conduct within the ambit of 
a statutory (or prerogative) discretion.66 Yet, discretion should not be looked at 
in ‘all-or-nothing’ terms; rather we should think of a sliding scale along which 
the nature and degree of the discretion conferred can vary signifi cantly. Th e 
mere existence of some small element of discretion is insuffi  cient to preclude the 
imposition of a duty of care:67
‘Acts may be done pursuant and subsequent to the exercise of a discretion where 
a duty of care may exist – as has oft en been said even knocking a nail into a piece 
of wood involves the exercise of some choice or discretion and yet there may be 
a duty of care in the way it is done. Whether there is an element of discretion to 
do the act is thus not a complete test leading to the result that, if there is, a claim 
against an authority for what it actually does or fails to do must necessarily be 
ruled out.’
3) Policy and Operational Spheres
27 As the existence of an element of discretion in the task being performed 
thus does not exclude the possibility of a duty of care, it is necessary to explore 
more closely the nature of the discretion conferred. In a well-known passage of 
64 [1970] AC 1004, 1053.
65 See eg D v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] England & Wales Court of 
Appeal (Civil Division) (EWCA Civ) 646, [2016] QB 161 at [68] per Laws LJ: ‘Such a margin 
of discretion is, however, quite foreign to the adjudication of common law claims: once the 
court has ascertained what the relevant duty of care requires, its remaining task is to decide 
whether there has been a breach of the duty causing damage. No margin of discretion enters 
into the exercise.’
66 See eg X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 736 f per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson.
67 Barrett v London Borough of Enfi eld [2001] 2 AC 550, 571 per Lord Slynn.
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his opinion in Anns v Merton LBC,68 Lord Wilberforce resorted to a distinction 
between policy and operational spheres of a public body’s activities:
‘Most, indeed probably all, statutes relating to public authorities or public bodies, 
contain in them a large area of policy. Th e courts call this “discretion”, meaning 
that the decision is one for the authority or body to make, and not for the courts. 
Many statutes, also, prescribe or at least pre-suppose the practical execution of policy 
decisions: a convenient description of this is to say that in addition to the area of 
policy or discretion, there is an operational area. Although this distinction between 
the policy area and the operational area is convenient, and illuminating, it is probably 
a distinction of degree; many “operational” powers or duties have in them some 
element of “discretion”. It can safely be said that the more “operational” a power or 
duty may be, the easier it is to superimpose on it a common law duty of care.’
28 It may be noted that Lord Wilberforce used the term ‘policy’ in this passage 
in a special sense. He was not referring to considerations of public policy that 
bear upon the fairness, justice and reasonableness of imposing a duty of care. 
Rather, he was highlighting the need to enquire whether activities undertaken by 
a public authority in the policy sphere (eg in assessing budgetary priorities) raise 
issues that are truly suitable for judicial resolution.
4) Justiciability
29 Th is point was reinforced when Lord Wilberforce’s distinction between 
policy and operational spheres was subsequently considered by Lord Keith, 
delivering the advice of the Privy Council in the case of Rowling v Takaro 
Properties Ltd:69
‘[T]his distinction does not provide a touchstone of liability, but rather is expressive 
of the need to exclude altogether those cases in which the decision under attack is 
of such a kind that a question whether it has been made negligently is unsuitable 
for judicial resolution, of which notable examples are discretionary decisions on 
the allocation of scarce resources or the distribution of risks … [C]lassifi cation of 
the relevant decision as a policy or planning decision in this sense may exclude 
liability; but a conclusion that it does not fall within that category does not, in their 
Lordships’ opinion, mean that a duty of care will necessarily exist.’
30 In the quoted passage, Lord Keith underlines that the policy–operations 
distinction is not ‘a touchstone of liability’. It does not itself determine whether 
there is a duty of care; it is only a mechanism for fi ltering out claims which 
are unsuitable for judicial resolution. In the literature, this idea of suitability 
68 [1978] AC 728, 754.
69 [1988] AC 473, 501.
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for judicial resolution frequently goes by the name ‘justiciability’.70 How 
justiciability is to be assessed remains somewhat uncertain, and there is an 
element of circularity in doing so with reference to ideas of discretion and policy 
which themselves already express the unsuitability of certain matters for judicial 
decision. And yet, there is no more fundamental notion to which reference 
can be made at this point, and it is thus inevitable that the courts will rely on 
somewhat intuitive judgments as to what is ‘discretionary’ or ‘in the policy 
sphere’ and so ‘non-justiciable’.
5) Irrationality
31 A fi nal concept used by the courts in determining whether public authority 
liability can arise is ‘irrationality’ or ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’. As 
mentioned above (no 15), conduct is unreasonable in the necessary sense if it 
is so unreasonable that no reasonable public authority would have acted that 
way. A fi nding of irrationality thus presupposes that the conduct in question 
was indeed suitable for judicial evaluation – indeed, it is the outcome of such 
evaluation. Th e test is sometimes presented as an alternative to the ordinary test 
of negligence, but it has been convincingly argued that it is simply the ordinary 
test of negligence in the form it must assume when applied to contexts in 
which a range of reasonable courses of action were open to a public authority 
defendant.71
6) Integration within Ordinary Approach to Liability
32 How the various factors listed above can be integrated within the ordinary 
approach to liability is far from self-evident, but there seems to be an emerging 
consensus that three distinct phases of inquiry should be distinguished:72 (1) 
Does the alleged negligence relate to policy considerations that are unsuitable 
for judicial resolution (ie non-justiciable): if so, the claim fails in limine; if not, 
the court must determine whether the public authority owed the claimant a duty 
of care. (2) In deciding whether or not the public authority owed the claimant 
a duty of care, if the alleged negligence relates to the exercise of a discretion 
involving the evaluation of policy considerations may be a reason for fi nding 
that it would not be fair, justice and reasonable to recognise such a duty on the 
circumstances of the case; if so, the claim fails for that reason. (3) If, however, the 
70 See PP Craig, Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power (1978) 94 LQR 428; Booth/
Squires (fn 4) ch 2.
71 Bailey/Bowman [1986] CLJ 430, 434 ff ; Bailey/Bowman [2000] CLJ 85, 130 f. But cf D Nolan, 
Varying the Standard of Care in Negligence [2011] CLJ 651, 659–63 and 667–69.
72 Th is approach is broadly consistent with that adopted by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the 
leading case of X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 740 ff  and by Booth/
Squires (fn 4).
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public authority did owe the claimant a duty of care, the court must determine 
whether the authority breached that duty on the facts, and where the alleged 
breach of duty relates to the exercise of a discretion the court should ask whether 
the authority’s conduct was irrational in the sense of being so unreasonable that 
no reasonable public authority would have acted that way.
D. INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY73
33 A public employer is strictly liable for torts committed by its employees in 
the scope of their employment (vicarious liability), but the employee may also be 
sued personally by the victim, and is in theory subject to the employer’s right of 
indemnity,74 though this is almost never exercised.75 Th e same applies in respect 
of relationships of principle and agent, and similar relationships in which there 
is no contract of employment.76 Where multiple tortfeasors are responsible for 
the same damage, the ordinary rule of joint and several liability applies in claims 
against one or more of them by the victim77 – there is no discretion to make 
a proportional award instead.78 As between themselves, however, the relative 
responsibility of each tortfeasor is refl ected in the rights of contribution and 
indemnity that arise – here, apportionment is the rule.79
34 Th ere is no general principle by which the State as such (ie the Crown) 
assumes liability for torts committed by public bodies or the latter’s offi  cers, 
agents or employees. By statute, the Crown is subject to all those liabilities in tort 
to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be subject 
in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents, any breach of those 
duties which a person owes to his servants or agents at common law by reason 
of being their employer, and any breach of the duties attaching at common 
law to the ownership, occupation, possession or control of property.80 No such 
liability arises, however, in respect of the discharge or purported discharge 
of responsibilities of a judicial nature or responsibilities connected with the 
execution of judicial process.81
73 See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) para 5.56 ff .
74 Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555.
75 Reliance on the indemnity is normally excluded by collective agreement. See generally 
R Lewis, Insurers’ agreements not to enforce strict legal rights: bargaining with Government 
and in the shadow of the law (1985) 48 MLR 275, 281 ff .
76 For the police, see Police Act 1996, sec 88(1).
77 See S Steel, Joint Torts, in: K Oliphant (ed), Th e Law of Tort (3rd edn 2015).
78 Cf Law Commission (fn 11) para 4.84 ff , and no 50 ff  below.
79 See Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.
80 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, sec 2.
81 Ibid, sec 2(5). See further D Feldman (ed), English Public Law (2nd edn, 2009) para 6.57 ff  and 
no 43 below.
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E. RANGE OF APPLICATION
35 In English public authority liability law, more attention is typically paid to 
areas of ‘no duty’ or ‘restricted duty’ than those where a duty of care is readily 
established. Th e following may be given as illustrations of no-duty or restricted-
duty situations: the investigation of crime by the police;82 the response of the 
fi re service to emergency calls83 (but cf the ambulance service84); fi nancial 
regulation;85 dangerous driving conditions on a road subject to highway 
authority control;86 and the investigation by social services of suspected child 
abuse (duty to a child taken into care but not to the parents,87 or to children not 
taken into care but left  in harmful domestic environment88). Several of these 
examples refl ect the common law’s reluctance to impose duties of affi  rmative 
action, no less upon public authorities than private persons.89 Th e exclusionary 
rule generally applicable to pure economic loss also applies in public authority 
liability claims, again with the eff ect of limiting the circumstances in which 
such claims can succeed.90 To some limited extent, these restrictions may be 
circumvented by bringing a claim under the HRA, which is considered below 
(no 40).
36 As regards the various situations in which an immunity from liability may 
arise – for example, in the judicial and legislative contexts – see no 43 ff  below.
82 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; Brooks v Commissioner of the Police for 
the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police 
[2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225; Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] 
United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) 2, [2015] AC 1732. Cf Van Colle v Chief Constable of 
Hertfordshire [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225 (HRA claim only).
83 Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004. See also OLL Ltd v 
Secretary of State for Transport [1997] 3 All England Law Reports (All ER) 897 (coastguard).
84 Kent v Griffi  ths [2001] QB 36.
85 Davis v Radcliff e [1990] 1 WLR 821. For specifi c statutory immunities, see no 45 below.
86 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 
UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057. Although sec 41(1) of the Highways Act 1980 imposes on every 
highway authority the duty to maintain the highways, and sec 58 expressly contemplates that 
breach of the duty is actionable in damages, this applies only to the maintenance in good 
repair of the physical fabric of the road and does not extend to the erection of traffi  c signs 
(Lavis v Kent County Council (1992) 90 Local Government Reports (LGR) 416) or the removal 
of dangers on land adjacent to the highway (Stovin v Wise [1994] 1 WLR 1124, CA). See 
further under Case 3.
87 D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373.
88 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633.
89 See especially Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; 
D  Nolan, Th e Liability of Public Authorities for Failing to Confer Benefi ts (2011) 127 LQR 
260.
90 See eg Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] 1 AC 853 (pure economic loss caused by 
revocation of registration). On this case, see further under Case 2.
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37 In practice, the following may be regarded as typical examples of public 
authority liability for negligence: the failure to maintain the highway;91 the 
conduct of dangerous police operations without taking adequate precautions to 
avoid collateral damage;92 a school’s failure to identify and respond to a pupil’s 
special educational needs;93 and the failure of an offi  cial in the land registry to 
record an interest in land.94
38 Liability also arises outside the tort of negligence for (by way of example) 
assault, battery or false imprisonment by the police95 or false imprisonment by 
the prison authorities in prolonging imprisonment beyond the term imposed.96
39 Actions for clinical negligence against health-care practitioners in the 
public sector are not considered to raise issues of public authority liability and 
are treated in the same ways as claims against health-care practitioners in the 
private sector. Th e same applies as regards road traffi  c accidents caused by public 
servants, even when driving in the performance of public functions, and to the 
liability of public authorities as employers or as occupiers of land. Th ese are not 
considered to be claims with a specifi cally public character.97
F. VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
40 Beyond the ordinary tort law claims discussed to this point, it should 
also be noted that the HRA established a statutory mechanism for obtaining 
compensation from a public authority in respect of its violation of rights under 
the ECHR.98 Th e Act makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a person’s Convention right99 and provides that such 
conduct may be the subject of proceedings before a court.100 Under the Act, the 
court has the power to grant whatever remedy within its powers it considers 
91 Highways Act 1980, sec 58. As regards the liabilities of highway authorities, see further under 
Case 3.
92 Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242.
93 Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619.
94 Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223.
95 See eg Wilson v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2002] EWCA Civ 434 (battery); 
Th ompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 498 (false imprisonment).
96 R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19.
97 Th us Booth/Squires (fn 4) addresses the liability of the ambulance service (para 12.34 ff ) but 
not the liability of the National Health Service in general.
98 It must be noted that, at the time of writing, it was declared Government policy to repeal the 
HRA, though no concrete proposals had been published.
99 Sec 6(1) HRA. Sec 1(1) HRA specifi es that ‘Convention rights’ means the rights and 
fundamental freedoms set out in arts 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, arts 1 to 3 of the First 
Protocol, and art 1 of the Th irteenth Protocol.
100 Sec 7(1) HRA.
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‘just and appropriate’, including the award of damages where this is necessary 
to aff ord ‘just satisfaction’ to the victim.101 Th e relationship of the statutory 
remedy with the general law of tort is much debated. Th ough some have argued 
for a convergence of the two bases of liability,102 the prevailing approach is to 
treat them as separate and distinct, and the courts have been mostly resistant to 
arguments that the ordinary law of tort should be adapted the better to protect 
the Convention rights against violations by public authorities.103 Conversely, 
where a claimant is able to recover damages in ordinary tort law, that generally 
has the eff ect of rendering it inappropriate to make any further award under 
sec 8.104 To that extent, the common law liability may be regarded as primary, 
and that under the statute as secondary. Th e sec  8 case-law certainly suggests 
that the award of damages for violation of a Convention right will be rare. In 
2006, the Department of Constitutional Aff airs (now the Ministry of Justice), 
reviewing the fi rst fi ve years of the Act’s operation, found only three cases 
in which damages had been awarded105 – and one of these was subsequently 
overturned.106 Th ere seems to be a particular reluctance to recognise duties 
of affi  rmative action on public authorities in circumstances where no such 
duty would arise in the law of tort, and, even in the case of public authorities 
who (like the police) have general responsibilities for public safety, a duty to 
intervene to protect life arises only where there is a ‘real and immediate risk’ 
to an identifi ed or identifi able individual.107 Nevertheless, the courts have now 
awarded HRA damages in a number of diff erent contexts – for example, the 
101 Sec 8(1) HRA. See generally Booth/Squires (fn 4) ch 7.
102 See eg J Steele, Damages in Tort and under the Human Rights Act: Remedial or Functional 
Separation? [2008] CLJ 606 (favouring a degree of convergence); J Varuhas, A Tort-Based 
Approach to Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 (2009) 72 MLR 750; id, ‘Damages: 
private law and the Human Rights Act 1998 – never the twain shall meet?’, in: D Hoff man 
(ed), Th e Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (2011).
103 See eg Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2009] 1 AC 225 at [136] ff  per Lord Brown; 
Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] AC 1732 at [123] ff  per Lord Toulson; 
F Du Bois, Human rights and the tort  liability  of  public  authorities (2011) 127 LQR 589; 
D Nolan, Negligence and Human Rights Law: Th e Case for Separate Development (2013) 76 
MLR 286. For criticism, see Giliker, Europeanisation (fn 10) 140 ff .
104 Th e award of damages in ordinary tort law will normally constitute ‘just satisfaction’ for any 
claim brought under the HRA, as it is most improbable – if not inconceivable – that such 
damages will be exceeded by an award for the infringement of Convention rights under sec 8. 
Consequently, no additional ‘top up’ award of HRA compensation will normally be necessary, 
though such an award may be appropriate where the claimant is not someone entitled to 
bring an action for damages in ordinary tort law: see Dobson v Th ames Water Utilities Ltd 
[2009] EWCA Civ 28, [2009] 3 All ER 319.
105 Department of Constitutional Aff airs, Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act 
(2006), 18.
106 van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2006] 3 All ER 963 (QB), reversed 
[2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225.
107 See van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police [2009] 1 AC 225; Michael v Chief 
Constable of South Wales Police [2015] AC 1732.
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provision of psychiatric care,108 child protection,109 imprisonment,110 detention 
under the mental health legislation,111 the provision of social housing,112 and 
police investigation of crime.113 Th e award of HRA damages is discretionary and 
governed by principles distinct from those applying to ordinary tort claims.114 
In quantum they broadly refl ect the level of awards made by the ECtHR in 
comparable cases brought by applicants from the UK or other countries with a 
similar cost of living.115
G. DEFENCES
41 Th e defences available generally in tort law apply, though the defence of 
statutory authority (for obvious reasons) is particularly oft en invoked. Th is 
provides that no liability will arise for doing that which the legislature has 
authorised, if it is done without negligence, even if it occasions damage to 
another; but an action lies for doing that which the legislature has authorised if it 
is done negligently.116
42 It is not strictly a defence that the claimant failed to exhaust all available 
appeal, complaint, etc, procedures before claiming on the basis of State liability, 
108 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 Appeal Cases (AC) 72 (suicide 
of voluntary psychiatric patient allowed to leave hospital when at real and immediate risk of 
taking own life; awards of £5000 for each parent).
109 Re H (A Child: Breach of Convention Rights: Damages) [2014] England and Wales Family 
Court (EWFC) 38 (taking of a new-born child into protective care in breach of its parents’ 
Convention rights; award of £6,000 for each parent).
110 R (Faulkner) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 23, [2013] 2 AC 254 (administrative 
failures prolonging period of imprisonment; award of £6,500; cf award of £300 in conjoined 
case for anxiety and distress caused by delay in review hearing, even though the delay did not 
aff ect the period of detention).
111 R (KB) v South London and South and West Region Mental Health Review Tribunal (Damages) 
[2003] EWHC 193 (Admin), [2004] QB 936 (delay in arranging review of detentions under 
mental health legislation; awards of between £750 and £4,000; fi nding of infringement 
provided suffi  cient just satisfaction in two of the cases).
112 R (Bernard) v Enfi eld LBC [2002] EWHC 2282, [2003] Human Rights Law Reports 111 (local 
authority’s failure to provide adequate housing for a disabled woman and her carer; awards of 
£8,000 and £2,000 respectively).
113 D v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2016] QB 161 (police failures delaying 
identifi cation and arrest of ‘black cab rapist’; awards of £22,500 and £19,000 to victims).
114 Sec 8 HRA; R (Greenfi eld) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 673 
at [19] per Lord Bingham. See further Law Commission/Scottish Law Commission, Damages 
under the Human Rights Act 1998, Law Com 266/Scot Law Com 180 (2000) and, for critical 
discussion, Steele [2008] CLJ 606; Varuhas (2009) 72 MLR 750; id (fn 102).
115 R (Faulkner) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 23, [2013] 2 AC 254.
116 Geddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir (1878) 3 Appeal Cases, Second Series (App Cas) 430.
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though the existence of alternative procedures may stand against the recognition 
of a duty of care.117
H. SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CASE
43 General immunities are enjoyed by the judge and the legislator. State 
liability for judicial and legislative acts or omissions can arise under EU 
law,118 but not at common law.119 At common law, judges are exempt from all 
civil liability for everything they say or do in their judicial capacity. Th ey face 
civil liability only for judicial acts in excess of jurisdiction that are performed 
in bad faith.120 For acts within jurisdiction, there is no liability even for acts 
actuated by malice.121 Where a claim for damages is brought under the HRA, 
damages in respect of judicial acts may not be awarded in respect of a judicial 
act done in good faith except to compensate a person to the extent required 
by art 5(5) ECHR; such award is to be made against the Crown.122 Otherwise, 
no proceedings lie against the Crown in respect of the discharge or purported 
discharge of any responsibilities of a judicial nature or connected with the 
execution of judicial process.123 Th e Court Service, though an agency of the 
executive, was established wholly or partly to facilitate and implement the 
functions of the judiciary and its failure to discharge its responsibilities in 
connection with the execution or implementation of judicial process is covered 
by Crown immunity.124 Even where Crown immunity does not arise, other 
mechanisms may be invoked to preclude the imposition of liability. For example, 
the Crown Prosecution Service owes no duty of care to a person investigated on 
117 See eg X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633. Cf Phelps v Hillingdon 
[1999] 1 WLR 500, 672 per Lord Clyde (noting that alternative redress mechanisms may not 
provide for full compensation for the victim for both past and future harm).
118 As regards the legislator, see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, R v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd [1996] ECR I-1029; R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame Ltd (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 524.
119 As regards judicial acts, see Crown Proceedings Act 1947, sec 2(5).
120 Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118; Re McC (A Minor) [1985] AC 528. As to magistrates, see Courts 
Act 2003, sec 31 f. Re McC (A Minor) provides an example of a case that was allowed to proceed 
in the basis of an excess of jurisdiction by magistrates. As to judicial immunity generally, see 
A Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity (1993); id, Accountability versus 
independence: Th e impact of judicial immunity, in: G Canivet/M  Andenas/D  Fairgrieve 
(eds), Independence, Accountability and the Judiciary (2006); J Murphy, Rethinking tortious 
immunity for judicial acts (2013) 33 Legal Studies (LS) 455.
121 Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668.
122 Sec 9(3), (4) HRA.
123 Crown Proceedings Act 1948, sec 2(5).
124 Quinland v Governor of Swaleside Prison [2002] EWCA Civ 174, [2003] QB 306 (failure to 
implement judge’s instruction to refer case to court for correction of error in calculation of 
prison term).
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suspicion of crime and so cannot be liable for loss caused by its negligence in 
prosecuting such person.125
44 It is inconceivable that a liability in damages could be imposed upon a 
legislator. Under the HRA, both Houses of Parliament are excluded from the 
defi nition of the ‘public authorities’ owing the obligation to act compatibly 
with the Convention rights,126 while the failure to make primary legislation is 
excluded from the defi nition of ‘an act’ within the scope of that obligation.127
45 Specifi c statutory immunities from tortious liability apply to the Financial 
Services Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority128 and to designated 
universal postal service providers.129
46 A common law ‘combat immunity’ applies to members of the armed 
forces, both in actions inter se and in claims brought by non-combatants.130 Th e 
immunity applies to actual or imminent armed confl ict, but not to things done 
– for example, training or the provision of technology and equipment – before 
hostilities commenced or became imminent.131
III. LIABILITY FOR LAWFUL CONDUCT
A. PRINCIPLES
47 English law recognises State liability for lawful conduct only exceptionally, 
refl ecting its rather hostile attitude towards strict liability for damage in 
general.  Such strict liabilities as are recognised (eg under the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher132) in principle apply to the State to the same extent as they do 
to private individuals. Sometimes, legislation authorising the pursuit of a 
potentially dangerous activity will subject the undertaker to a statutory liability 
125 Elguzouli Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335.
126 Sec 6(3) HRA.
127 Sec 6(6) HRA.
128 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, sch 1ZA para 25 and sch 1ZB para 33 respectively. 
Th e immunity does not extend to acts done in bad faith or contrary to sec 6(1) HRA.
129 Postal Services Act 2000, sec 90. Th e provider has a limited liability for loss of or damage to 
postal packets (sec 91) but is not otherwise liable for loss or damage caused by anything done 
or omitted to be done in relation to a postal packet in the course of transmission by post or 
the omission to carry out arrangements for the collection of anything to be conveyed by post: 
sec 90(1). Liability is also excluded for the provider’s employees: sec 90(2).
130 Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] QB 732. Th is survives the abolition of the former 
exclusions of tortious liability in cases involving the armed forces by Crown Proceedings 
(Armed Forces) Act 1987, sec 1.
131 Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52.
132 (1868) LR 3 HL 330.
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to compensate for resulting harm,133 and provide for the same liability to 
be borne by the Crown where it is a government department that pursues the 
activity in question.134 In some particular contexts – such as vaccine damage135 
and the slaughter of diseased animals136 – statute provides for compensation 
from the public purse for those injured by measures taken for the general 
public good. Statutory schemes also apply to compensation for criminal injuries 
and miscarriages of justice. Th e Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 
(CICS) provides compensation in respect of personal injury which is directly 
attributable to being a direct victim of a crime of violence.137 Th e compensation 
recovered under the CICS is calculated diff erently from that available by way 
of damages in tort law, being derived from a statutory tariff  and not based on 
the personalised assessment undertaken in tort cases. Th e maximum award is 
£500,000.138 As regards persons convicted of a criminal off ence, compensation 
may be paid where the conviction has been reversed or the convicted person 
has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows 
beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice.139 Th e 
entitlement to compensation is determined by the Secretary of State and its 
amount is assessed by an assessor appointed by him.140 Th e maximum sum that 
may be awarded is £500,000 – or £1 million in cases of detention for at least ten 
years – and compensation for loss of earnings is limited to 1.5 times median 
annual gross earnings.141 Compensation is awarded only when the conviction is 
quashed in full and there is no entitlement to compensation when a lesser verdict 
133 Th e best example is the right to compensation for damage caused by nuclear installations 
(Nuclear Installations Act 1965, sec 12).
134 See Nuclear Installations Act 1965, sec 9 (read with sec 12).
135 See Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979, analysed by G Dworkin, Compensation and 
Payments for Vaccine Damage [1979] J Social Welfare Law 330. A fi xed sum of £120,000 is 
paid, limited to cases of severe (ie 60% or greater) disablement resulting from vaccination 
against specifi ed diseases. Despite criticism of the scheme in Parliament, there are no current 
plans to reform it: see HC Deb 24 March 2015 vol 594 col 441WH.
136 See Animal Health Act 1981, secs 16A, 32A and 36. Following a major outbreak of foot and 
mouth disease in 2001, £1,158 million was paid in compensation in respect of the slaughter of 
over four million animals; the average payment to the farmers aff ected was around £125,000; 
the highest payment was over £4 million: National Audit Offi  ce, Th e 2001 Outbreak of Foot 
and Mouth Disease, HC 939, Session 2001–2002 (2002).
137 Th e Scheme was established under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995. See further 
Ministry of Justice, Th e Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (2012), available 
online at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
fi le/243480/9780108512117.pdf>. From a historical perspective, see K Oliphant, Landmarks 
of No-Fault in the Common Law, in: WH van Boom/M Faure (eds), Shift s in Compensation 
between Public and Private Systems (2007) nos 36–46.
138 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012, para 31.
139 Criminal Justice Act 1988, sec 133.
140 Criminal Justice Act 1988, sec 133(3) and (4).
141 Criminal Justice Act 1988, sec 133A.
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is substituted for the conviction quashed.142 Nor is compensation paid where an 
innocent person who was remanded in custody for a substantial period is then 
acquitted or, having been convicted, has the conviction reversed by the ordinary 
process of appeal.143
48 Additionally, since the late 18th century, English law has provided for 
compensation for the expropriation of land for public purposes.144 Compensation 
for depreciation in the value of real property caused by public works also came 
to be required even when there was no taking of the land aff ected.145 Th e Law 
Commission has highlighted the defi ciencies of the current ‘patchwork of diverse 
rules’, representing ‘the result of more than 150 years of piecemeal and oft en 
incoherent development’, that apply in this area146 but its proposals for reform 
have yet to be implemented.147 Th ough it is an established principle of statutory 
interpretation that legislation allowing the expropriation of property is to be 
construed – insofar as the wording, context and purpose allow – to provide for 
compensation in respect of the loss,148 the common law recognises no overriding 
constitutional principle preventing the expropriation of property or interference 
with it without compensation.149
142 R (Christofi des) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2002] EWHC 1083 (Admin), 
[2002] 1 WLR 2769.
143 For criticism of the scheme on these and other grounds, see JR Spencer, Compensation for 
wrongful imprisonment [2010] Criminal Law Review (Crim LR) 803.
144 For a summary of the current law and its historical development, see Law Commission, 
Towards a Compulsory Purchase Code: (1) Compensation, Law Com 286 (2003), Appendix C. 
Th e main current legislative provisions are the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 and, in respect 
of compensation, the Land Compensation Act 1961.
145 See now Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (CPA) sec 10 (compensation for ‘injurious aff ection’ 
caused by the construction of public works), considered in Wildtree Hotels Ltd v Harrow 
London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC, and Land Compensation Act 1973 (LCA) Part I 
(compensation payable where the value of property is depreciated by physical factors (noise, 
vibration, smell, etc) caused by the use of highways, aerodromes and other public works). 
Compensation is only payable if it exceeds £50 in amount: sec 10(2) CPA; sec 7 LCA. Th e 
historical background to and main features of the LCA are described by Carnwath LJ in 
Th omas v Bridgend County Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 862, [2012] QB 512 at [15] ff .
146 Law Commission (fn 143) xiii and para 1.29.
147 Th ough some practical issues were addressed by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
2004, this did not undertake the full revision of compensation provisions recommended by 
the Law Commission: D Elvin, Th e Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004: reform of 
the law of compulsory purchase: compulsory purchase for planning purposes, compensation 
and procedure (2004) Journal of Planning & Environment Law 1339, 1339.
148 See eg Central Control Board (Liquor Traffi  c) v Cannon Brewery Co Ltd [1919] AC 744, 760 per 
Lord Parmoor and 763 per Lord Wrenbury. Th is has been buttressed by sec 3 HRA, which 
requires legislation to be read and given eff ect in a way which is compatible with the ECHR 
rights specifi ed ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so’; the right to property under art 1 of the First 
Protocol is included.
149 In Westminster Bank Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1971] AC 508, 530 
Lord Reid stated that, where a public authority has two alternative statutory methods of 
achieving the same objective, it is entitled to adopt the one which imposes the least burden 
on the public purse. Th is remains true under the HRA, though the public authority’s decision 
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B. JUSTIFICATIONS
49 Th e issue of liability for lawful acts is not much discussed by English 
lawyers, though the idea is not without its supporters.150 For example, Tom 
Cornford has argued for recognition of a principle of strict liability for lawful 
acts by a public authority, drawing an express comparison with the French 
doctrine of égalité devant les charges publiques and the principle of liability 
for lawful acts recommended in 1984 by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe.151 In his view, the same principle already underpins English 
law insofar as it provides compensation for the expropriation of property and 
there is scope for giving it wider application with reference to the ECHR right 
to property, now incorporated in domestic law by the HRA.152 Th ough the 
argument is cogently put, it has not attracted signifi cant interest from scholars or 
law reformers.153
IV. CONCLUSIONS
50 Launching a consultation in 2008 on the law relating generally to 
administrative redress, the Law Commission expressed the opinion that 
the prevailing English approach led to results which were ‘inconsistent and 
unpredictable and in some cases unjust’.154 It doubted whether generally 
applicable restrictions on liability were justifi ed when the defendant was a public 
body,155 and proposed therefore the introduction of a special regime balancing 
may have to satisfy a test of proportionality: Cusack v Harrow London Borough Council [2013] 
UKSC 40, [2013) 1 WLR 2022.
150 In addition to the work discussed in the text, see also Street (fn 1) 78 ff ; Spencer [2010] Crim 
LR 803, 815 ff ; C Harlow, Rationalising administrative compensation [2010] Public Law (PL) 
321 (advocating adoption of a principle of compensation based on risk as a principle of good 
public administration). See also Marcic v Th ames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66, [2004] 
2 AC 42 at [45], where Lord Nicholls accepted the fairness of spreading the cost of damage 
suff ered by a minority placed at risk by the provision of a general amenity: the minority 
‘ought not to be required to bear an unreasonable burden.’
151 Council of Europe, Recommendation No R (84) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States Relating to Public Liability, 18 Sept 1984, Principle II.
152 Cornford (fn 1) chs 5 and 9. Th e principle was also considered in an independent review of 
administrative law in the United Kingdom, which concluded in 1988 that there was no case 
for legislation to implement the principle because Parliamentary practice was already to 
intervene and provide compensation (which could be partial) in those situations in which 
there was a special need for protection: Committee of the JUSTICE-All Souls Review of 
Administrative Law in the United Kingdom, Administrative Justice: Some Necessary Reforms 
(1998) paras 11.42–11.51 and 11.92.
153 Th e possibility of introducing the principle to English law was not addressed by the Law 
Commission in its recent work on administrative redress: Law Commission (fn 11); id (fn 18).
154 Law Commission (fn 11) para 3.137.
155 Ibid, para 3.136 ff .
Ken Oliphant
152 Intersentia
the interests of aggrieved claimants against the danger that liability might 
create an undue burden on resources.156 Under the proposal, the liability of public 
bodies for ‘truly public’ acts or omissions would be limited by a new requirement 
of ‘serious fault’, and restricted to situations where the underlying legislative 
scheme was intended to confer rights or benefi ts on the individual claimant. 
Th e intention was to expand the range of cases in which damages are potentially 
available – because the existing limitations on liability leave a number of gaps – 
but at the same time to counteract any consequential increase in liability costs 
by raising the threshold of fault. Th e latter consideration also underpinned the 
Commission’s further recommendation that there should be a departure from 
the ordinary English rule of ‘joint and several’ liability by which any party liable 
in tort for the same damage may be ordered to compensate the victim in full, 
albeit with the right to seek contribution or indemnity from other responsible 
parties. It was felt that joint and several liability could operate harshly in the 
present context, as the State – always an attractive target for litigation because of 
its ‘deep pockets’ – would be left  to bear the full cost of compensating the victim 
if other responsible parties were insolvent or could not be traced, even if its 
culpability was comparatively small.157 Th e Law Commission’s recommendation 
was that there should be a judicial discretion to apportion the liability of a public 
body for a truly public act or omission when this would be equitable in a given 
situation.
51 Th e Commission explicitly linked its proposed requirements of ‘serious 
fault’ and ‘intent to confer a benefi t’ with the EU Court of Justice’s approach to 
Member State liability.158 However, the CJEU’s test of ‘suffi  ciently serious breach’ 
seems to have been inadvertently transformed in adapting it to English law, 
becoming in the Law Commission’s proposal a test of ‘serious fault’. Th e CJEU 
test – by way of contrast – does not necessarily entail fault as it is conceived in 
English law, even if the degree of fault exhibited is a relevant consideration in 
determining seriousness.159 To that extent, the Law Commission’s proposal 
seemed rather more restrictive than the test on which it purported to be 
modelled.
52 Th e requirement of an intent to confer a benefi t on the claimant was 
superfi cially similar to the existing requirement of the tort of breach of statutory 
duty that the statute was intended to confer a private right of action on the 
claimant. But the Law Commission’s proposed test was in fact somewhat more 
easily satisfi ed because Parliament may intend to benefi t particular sections of 
156 Ibid, para 4.3.
157 Ibid, para 4.64 ff .
158 Ibid, para 4.4, referring to Case C-6/90, Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357.
159 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 524.
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society by the passage of particular legislative provisions without adverting at 
all to the question whether an action for damages should be allowed if there is 
a breach of duty. Implementation of the proposal would therefore have meant 
that the separate tortious liability for breach of statutory duty was eff ectively 
redundant in actions against public bodies, and the Consultation Paper in fact 
contemplated its abolition in that context, though not as regards breaches of 
health and safety legislation.160
53 Th e Law Commission’s proposals elicited a somewhat hostile reaction from 
many academic commentators, who perceived a lack of clarity and coherence 
in the key concepts of ‘serious fault’, ‘truly public’ and ‘conferral of benefi t’, and 
objected to the State putting itself apart from the ordinary citizen by excluding 
its liability for ‘mere’ negligence. To at least one respected commentator, the 
proposals were ‘unprincipled and lacking in coherence’.161 Th e Government 
was no more enthusiastic, and the Law Commission announced in May 2010 its 
decision not to press the issue of reform further in view of this opposition of 
its ‘key stakeholder – Government’.162 One judge subsequently remarked that 
‘it is a troubling comment on the functioning of the separation of powers that 
the state’s independent law reform advisory body has had to abandon a project 
aff ecting the liability of government to governed principally because the control 
exercised by government over Parliament would frustrate any reform, however 
wise or necessary, which would make government’s life more diffi  cult.’163
54 Nevertheless, the Law Commission continues to believe that reform is 
desirable so as to address shortfalls in the law, even if it is not politically feasible 
at present. In that, it probably expresses the opinion of most participants in the 
system and the majority of observers.164 Where diff erences emerge is in precisely 
how the system should be reformed, with some advocating a move away from civil 
liability altogether, in favour of a general remedy for public maladministration 
by way of a statutory compensation scheme,165 while others press for the 
rationalisation of existing liability rules through the abandonment of current 
restrictions on liability, which they see as arbitrary and unfair.166 At present, 
however, it seems most likely that the forces of legislative inertia will prevail.
160 Law Commission (fn 11) para 4.105.
161 T Cornford, Administrative redress: the Law Commission’s consultation paper [2009] PL 70, 70.
162 Law Commission (fn 18) paras 1.3 and 1.6.
163 Mohammed v Home Offi  ce [2011] 1 WLR 2862 at [23] per Sedley LJ.
164 For a selection of views, see C Harlow (fn 1); S Bailey, Public Authority Liability in Negligence: 
the Continued Search for Coherence (2006) 26 LS 155; Cornford (fn 1).
165 See C Harlow (fn  1). Cf Bailey (2006) 26 LS 155, advocating the development of ex gratia 
schemes and the provision of remedies through ombudsmen to fi ll in the gaps in the existing 
system of civil liability, but not a move away from civil liability altogether.
166 See eg Cornford (fn 1).

